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• In the crisis, central banks haven't been boring. In the wake of the crisis a
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prudential supervision. But there is no fool-proof way to identify bubbles
before they burst, so this new responsibility is likely to require increased
discretionary decision making. 
• In addition, institutions in charge of financial stability will also require new
instruments, including financial regulation. As a result, it seems almost
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poses serious accountability and reputational risks for the ECB, which
deserve to be addressed proactively.
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CAN A LESS BORING ECB REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE?
JEAN PISANI-FERRY AND JAKOB VON WEIZSÄCKER,SEPTEMBER 2009
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY in central
banking were defined and promoted as objectives
at a time when central banks around the word
thought their mission was to be predictable,
guarded and conservative – “boring”, as Mervyn
King, the governor of the Bank of England, aptly
said in 20001. Indeed, in recent decades the trend
has been for central banks to become more
independent in order to credibly focus monetary
policies on price stability. This clear focus and
independent mandate have gone hand in hand
with greater transparency and accountability of
central bank action. 
Yet, since the crisis started in 2007 and especially
as it has evolved into a global shock of historic
proportions, central banking has become anything
but boring. Central banks have de factotaken on a
much enhanced role and have successfully
contributed to limiting the consequences of the
financial crisis. The ECB in particular emerges from
the last two years as a greatly-strengthened
institution that has been able to react to
unexpected events forcefully and creatively.
But these developments also have longer term
implications for the role of central banks. In
particular, recent experience suggests that they
should worry about financial stability before
bubbles build up, and not only – as Greenspan had
it – once they burst. This would break with the
trend of the last few decades, which has been
towards central banks having a single policy
objective, namely price stability, and a precise,
even numerical definition of that objective. 
To attempt to stop bubbles before they have a
chance to become systematically threatening will
be a considerable challenge.  Almost by definition,
there is no fool-proof way to identify bubbles
before they burst. Distinguishing them empirically
from genuine productivity boosts (which should
be accommodated by monetary policy) will
require delicate judgement calls. This is why
central banks before this crisis were reluctant to
take on responsibility for the price of assets in the
same way as for the price of goods and services. 
Furthermore, beyond their specific remit, central
banks are bound to be given an enhanced and
qualitatively new role in the monitoring and
prevention of financial risks. In the US, the Obama
plan envisages giving the Fed responsibility for
the supervision of all large financial institutions,
and creating a Financial Services Oversight
Council in which the Fed will participate and on
which it will be able to rely. In Europe, the
European Council agreed in June to implement the
proposals contained in the De Larosière report and
to create a European Systemic Risk Board2chaired
by the president of the ECB as a macro-prudential
early warning mechanism.
This new mission is bound to bring central banks
onto a much more political terrain than they have
been confined to so far. For these 'warnings' may
intrinsically cover a much wider range of policy
domains than traditional monetary policy, not
only those of regulatory and supervisory agencies
but in some cases domains where the usual
players are governments and parliaments.
The likely broadening of the central bank’s
mandate to include, directly or indirectly, macro-
financial stability immediately raises delicate
issues about the desirable division of labour.
1. “Our ambition at the
Bank of England is to be
boring”, King (2000)
said, “our belief is that
boring is best [for the
management of the
economy]”.
2. Report of the High Level
Group on Financial Su-
pervision in the EU,
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Which of these powerful instruments should be
placed under the direct control of democratically-
elected and immediately-accountable govern-
ments, which should be under the control of
specialised agencies with sometimes consider-
able autonomy in decision making, and which
should be under the control of independent central
banks? And how should these different actors
exchange information and coordinate?
To explore the possible implications of this macro-
prudential agenda on central banking, in particular
on transparency and accountability, the
remainder of this note proceeds as follows. The
next section outlines how central banking evolved
before the crisis. The third section explores the
new agenda in more detail. The fourth and final
section formulates a set of questions that might
be of particular interest for the dialogue between
the European Parliament and the President of the
European Central Bank.
This note does not address any of the exit strategy
issues and is entirely devoted to the longer-term
post-crisis agenda. 
CENTRAL BANKING IN RECENT DECADES3
Perhaps the most marked trend in central banking
in recent decades has been the rapid increase in
central bank independence, as shown by Figure 1.
In parallel, the trend has been to make price
stability the priority for monetary policy, steering
away from the traditional trade-off between
inflation and output stabilisation (with the notable
exceptions of the US and, formally at least,
Japan). It is worth noting that greater central bank
independence and the strengthened focus on
price stability have yielded impressive results.
Globally, inflation rates have come down
significantly in recent decades. Inflation higher
than 15 percent per year has now become a rarity
even in the developing world (Figure 2).
Figure 1: Central bank independence in the
1980s and the 2000s
Note: central bank independence index based on four
components, relating to, respectively, appointment
procedures for the head of the central bank, the resolution of
conflict between the central bank and the executive branch of
government, the use of an explicit policy target, and rules
limiting lending to government.Source: Crow and Meade
(2008), based on Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992).
Figure 2: World distribution of inflation rates,
1980-2007
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
Differences in outcomes do persist, not only
because of differences in the general institutional
set up. It matters not only what central banks aim
to do but how they go about doing it. Since the
early 1990s, central banks have increasingly
relied on a specific implicit rule based on medium-
run inflation forecasts – inflation targeting. This
started in 1990 in New Zealand, soon followed by
Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia
and others. The ECB itself has been increasingly
3. This section partially
draws on Bénassy-Quéré,
Coeuré, Jacquet and Pisani-
Ferry (2010).CAN A LESS BORING ECB REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE?Pisani-Ferry and von Weizsäcker
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influenced by this approach, although it always
fell short of adopting it. 
Inflation targeting is a sophisticated strategy.
Contrary to what is commonly believed, it does not
target the current rate of inflation, but the central
bank’s own inflation forecast. This forecast is
conditional on all available information, including
the current (and possibly future) monetary
stance. The transparency of the rule is ensured
through publishing both inflation forecasts
(frequently accompanied by their standard
deviation) and the models and assumptions used
to prepare them. 
This strategy has two significant advantages.
First, it ensures a high degree of transparency and
predictability of monetary policy because the
central bank has one primary objective and
communicates in real time on how likely it is to
reach its objective within a given time frame.
Second, it combines the advantages of a rules-
based policy with reliance on a wider set of
information that is traditionally associated with
the discretionary approach4.
This recent trend has indeed further enhanced
transparency and accountability in central
banking. Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) quantified
these effects, defining transparency as “the
extent to which central banks disclose
information that is related to the policymaking
process”. They even distinguish between several
types of transparency as seen in Table 1. 
By the late 2000s central banking around the
world was therefore converging on a model
characterised by high degrees of independence,
specialisation (on the price stability objective),
and transparency. These three characteristics
were mutually consistent as well as consistent
with accountability. 
However, this has fundamentally changed with the
crisis in which asset price bubbles have played a
key role. The crisis is leading to a fundamental re-
examination of the central banks’ mandate and
strategy. As will be discussed in the next section,
this is not merely a marginal shift. It is likely to
have serious institutional and policy
consequences that will require intense political
reflection over the coming months and beyond.
And it is likely to affect in a rather fundamental
way the approach to transparency and
accountability. 
A NEW POLICY FRAMEWORK
The current global financial crisis was triggered
not least by asset prices bubbles that developed
during years of price stability. As a result, the
notion that financial stability needs to feature
much more prominently among the objectives of
central banks, and that a framework for macro-
prudential supervision should be developed, has
rapidly gained prominence and can today be
considered mainstream5. However, this has
important doctrinal, institutional and procedural
implications, which matter for accountability and
‘The crisis is leading to a fundamental re-examination of the central banks’ mandate and
strategy. This is not merely a marginal shift. It is likely to have serious institutional and policy
consequences that will require intense political reflection.’
4. For a recent survey of
inflation targeting see
Svensson (2008).
5. See eg De Larosière
(2009) and IMF
(2009).
Australia Canada Euro area Japan N. Zealand Sweden Switz UK USA
Political 3 3 3 1.5 3 3 2.5 3 1
Economic 2 2.5 2.5 1.5 3 2 1.5 3 2.5
P r o c e d u r a l 111233132
Policy 1.5 2 2 1.5 3 3 2 1.5 3
Operational 1.5 2 2 1.5 2 3 0.5 2.5 1.5
TOTAL 9 10.5 10.5 8 14 14 7.5 13 10
Table 1: Central bank transparency index, 2002
Source:  Eijffinger and Geraats (2006).CAN A LESS BORING ECB REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE?Pisani-Ferry and von Weizsäcker
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which are far from fully understood at this stage.
Perhaps a good starting point is the 'Tinbergen
rule', which states that an institution needs as
many policy instruments as there are policy
objectives6. The past trend towards specialisation
was very much an application of this rule: in a
nutshell, the central bank was given one objective,
price stability, and was in control of one
instrument, the short-term interest rate7.
If an institution has more than one objective and
only one instrument, or more generally more
objectives than instruments, it must engage in
trade-offs across objectives – which is precisely
what the monetary policy framework, developed
over the last few decades, tried to avoid. Trade-offs
complicate accountability and transparency as
the institution needs to rank equally desirable
objectives and make real-time choices between
them8.
This is especially important for a pan-European
institution like the ECB. In the past, countries such
as Spain and Ireland experienced serious real
estate bubbles. It would have been very hard to
explain to the other euro-area countries that a
country without any suspected bubble should
suffer increased interest rates and subsequently
higher rates of unemployment as a result of
fighting a suspected bubble elsewhere despite the
absence of an immediate inflation risk. 
The solution to this dilemma is to have as many
instruments as there are objectives – which in
principle ensures that these objectives can be
reached. But this does not eliminate all questions.
Notably, one question that remains is whether
each instrument should be assigned to a
particular objective pursued independently by a
particular institution, or whether instruments and
objectives should be managed in conjunction.
Whatever the response, ensuring the
accountability and transparency of a multi-task
institution is bound to be more complex than for a
single-task institution. 
The accountability challenge becomes even more
complex when coordination between different
institutions controlling different instruments is
involved. In fact, one of the arguments frequently
made against coordination among institutions is
that it blurs responsibility and complicates
accountability. 
In concrete terms, if the central bank is to be
directly or indirectly given responsibility for
financial stability, the interest rate instrument will
no longer be enough and needs to be
complemented by other means. These should
primarily belong to the financial regulation toolkit,
as is the case for countercyclical capital
requirements to “dampen rather than amplify the
financial and economic cycle” (as indicated in the
April 2009 G20 declaration)9. But other instru-
ments can be considered, such as supervisory
guidance, legislative measures or possibly even
tax measures that influence effective real interest
rates, such as the deductibility regime of
mortgage payments.
This perspective helps shed light on the current
debates. The system currently envisaged in the EU
(Box 1, overleaf) would give to the European
Systemic Risk Board the task to “monitor and
assess potential threats to financial stability and,
where necessary, issue risk warnings and
recommendations for action and monitor their
implementation” (European Council conclusions,
18-19 June 2009).  This suggests the ECB at the
same time will potentially have to pay more
attention to financial stability in the setting of
interest rates andcontribute to ensuring that other
means are used to contribute to the same end.  
6. After Jan Tinbergen,
Dutch economist who was
awarded the Nobel prize in
1969.
7. This is clearly a
simplification, but one that
comes close to the
representation of the role of
central banks in the modern
macroeconomic literature.
8. See De Grauwe and Gros
(2009) for a detailed
discussion of the trade-off
involved for central banks
with only the interest rate
instrument to deal with
price and financial sector
stability.
9. There is still discussion in
the supervisory community
and among experts on what
is the best instrument to
reach this goal. No
consensus has yet been
reached. An alternative is
the 'dynamic provisioning'
in the reserve requirements
for banks, as is already
current practice in Spain.
‘If an institution has more objectives than instruments, it must engage in trade-offs across
objectives – which is precisely what the monetary policy framework, developed over the last
few decades, tried to avoid. Trade-offs complicate accountability and transparency.’CAN A LESS BORING ECB REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE?Pisani-Ferry and von Weizsäcker
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BOX 1: MACROPRUDENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DE LAROSIÈRE REPORT
In October 2008, the European Commission President requested a group of high-level experts to
prepare a report on the future of financial regulation and supervision against the background of the
economic crisis. This report, published in February 2009, contained a host of recommendations
regarding the micro-prudential regulation of financial institutions and products at the European
level. However, it recognised that these steps will need to be complemented by better macro-
prudential supervision, taking into account that apparently independent micro-risks can be highly
correlated because of system-wide and macro-economic linkages. As a result, excellent micro-
prudential regulation may fail to detect the build-up of major economic risks. 
To address this problem, the De Larosière report recommended the creation of a European Systemic
Risk Council (ESRC), to be chaired by the President of the ECB and organised under the auspices and
with the logistical support of the ECB. ESRC members should be the member of the General Council
of the ECB, the chairpersons of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, the Committee of
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, the Committee of European Securities
Regulators, and a representative of the European Commission. Whenever justified by the issues at
stake, the Governors of the relevant national central banks could choose to be represented by the
head of the relevant insurance or securities supervisory authorities. The ESRC should pool and
analyse all information relevant for macro-prudential supervision and assure a proper flow of
information between it and the micro-prudential supervisors. 
If and when the ESRC issues a macro-prudential warning, there should be mandatory follow-up and
actions by the relevant authorities in the EU. If the warnings are of a serious nature, then the
chairman of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) is to be informed, so that the EFC, together
with the European Commission, can implement a strategy to address these risks. Should the risks
be of a global nature, then appropriate international bodies (International Monetary Fund, Financial
Stability Forum, Bank for International Settlements) are to be informed to define appropriate actions
at EU and global level. Enforcement at the European level is proposed to be organised via the EFC in
case a national supervisor's response to a risk warning is deemed inadequate. 
This proposed creation of a European macro-prudential supervisory body has received widespread
support and was endorsed by the European Council in June 2009 (which decided the creation of a
Board rather than a Council, hence ERSB). 
However, while the desirability of an early warning system is almost universally agreed, there are
legitimate questions about how effective it will be in practice. First, historical experience shows that
bubbles generally have a plausible narrative of a positive productivity shock that is accepted by a
significant proportion of the economic actors and experts. Second, it is unclear if, in times of crisis,
the coordination and free information flow between national authorities and the European macro-
prudential supervisory body would continue to function adequately despite possibly divergent
incentives. In view of these difficulties in times of stress, it may well be that functional macro-
prudential supervision at the European level will ultimately require truly European micro-prudential
counterparts. However, such a step has proven difficult politically because national governments
jealously guard their national micro-supervisory role, which is why even the De Larosière report trod
carefully in this respect.CAN A LESS BORING ECB REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE?Pisani-Ferry and von Weizsäcker
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QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The preceeding analysis raises a number of
questions, which can be summarised as follow: 
a)Should the definition of the ECB's objectives be
amended to give more weight to financial
stability? If not (assuming the treaty language
can accommodate the increased weight likely
to be given to it in practice), where and how
should the objective be defined in a way that
facilitates the monitoring of the central bank’s
performance? Should financial stability be
considered part of the 'general economic
policies' that the ECB should support? Or
should financial stability be considered a
condition of lasting price stability?
b)If the central bank is to give more weight to
financial stability, what are the implications for
the assignment of monetary policy to the
primary goal of price stability? Does it mean
that the central bank should be able to trade-
off short-term price stability for longer-term
financial stability, in other words to set the
interest rate at a level that is higher than what
is required to achieve price stability over the
usual forecast horizon? Or should the central
bank err on the side of caution? How should
such decisions be communicated and how
should central bank accountability be ensured? 
c) When pursuing financial stability, how can the
ECB as an interest-rate setting institution take
into account the variety of situations within the
euro area? Do serious threats to financial
stability in some countries or markets justify
reacting more aggressively, implicitly giving
them more importance than justified by their
quantitative weight?  
d)How much discretion should there be in the
management of countercyclical regulatory
instruments? Should action be based on rules,
or should there be room for discretion, at least
during a learning phase? 
e)How does the ECB intend to manage the risk of
increased competencies coupled with the increas-
ingly political character of its decisions ultimately
undermining support for its independence? 
f) Can the ECB be held accountable for the
achievement of financial stability although it is
not fully in charge of the corresponding
instruments, and the responsibility for
implementation is left to the regulatory and
supervisory agencies?
‘Can the ECB be held accountable for the achievement of financial stability although it is not
fully in charge of the corresponding instruments, and the responsibility for implementation is
left to the regulatory and supervisory agencies?’CAN A LESS BORING ECB REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE?Pisani-Ferry and von Weizsäcker
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